,Orders for removal under Section 47 of the 1948 National Assistance Act are little discussed. However, they involve severe infringements of the civil liberties of those affected. It is argued that all previously presentedjustifications for the use of these orders fail. Repeal of the act is calledfor. The Law Commission has drafted alternative legislation, but this has not been enacted. Until this occurs local authorities, the Faculty ofPublic Health Medicine and individual public health physicians should refuse to be involved in its use.
Introduction This paper will examine the use of orders allowing compulsory detention of competent adults under Section 47 of the 1948 National Assistance Act. These orders are used infrequently and so their justification is little discussed and often overlooked. However, they involve a serious interference with the civil liberty and human rights of those affected. I argue strongly that all suggested justifications of these orders fail, and present a way forward to prevent these injustices.
Section 47, as it is referred to by those who are involved in its implementation, is "for the purpose of securing the necessary care and attention for persons who: a) are suffering from grave chronic disease, or being aged, infirm or physically incapacitated, are living in unsanitary conditions, and b) are unable to devote to themselves, and are not receiving from other persons, proper care and attention".
It gives discretionary powers which allow, after a seven day delay: "removal of the person to whom the application relates ... to a suitable hospital or other place in or within a convenient distance of, the area of the appropriate authority, and his detention and maintenance therein." The person can then be detained for any period initially up to three months, which may be extended by further three month periods. Following the case described above, amending legislation was introduced. This 1951 amendment allows for immediate action, but only in the interests of the individual concerned.
The people affected often live alone in filthy conditions. Their houses are usually in a poor state of repair' and lack basic amenities.' Excrement and rubbish may fill the home and the smell can be overpowering. The people affected are often medically ill, incontinent and immobile. 4 Those making orders rarely doubt that some action is required. Our basic instincts are to intervene when faced by such apparent need. The section is not used frequently (there are just over 100 removals a year)5 but it involves a serious infringement of liberty. It is therefore important to consider the grounds for acting on these instincts.
In the interests of others Some removals are in the interests of others, for the prevention of "injury to the health of, or serious nuisance to, other persons". Few will deny the validity of the first of these reasons. Mill, classically one of the strongest defenders of individual liberty, allows this exception. He writes that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others".6 Whether we feel that "serious nuisance" can also be classified as harm that is sufficiently great to allow such restrictions is perhaps a more difficult decision. (In law a nuisance is something that causes either physical damage to the neighbour's property or a substantial interference with its use and enjoyment.) In either case the restrictions on an individual's liberty should be kept to a minimum. Such a defence leads us to question whether the act is unjustifiably discriminatory in its application. It is only applicable to those who are old, infirm or disabled. If we wish to allow the state these powers for these reasons, we surely would wish them to apply to all members of society.
Where alternative solutions can be found that are less destructive of individual liberty we should reject this justification of the use of the act. Alternative powers are available to allow cleaning of a house or garden.
In their own interests
In many cases, and all those using the 1951 amendment, we are ostensibly concerned with the interests of the person detained. We need to consider the extent to which such paternalism is a valid justification. There Legal confusion over the role expected of doctors carrying out these procedures is important. The relevance of the medical function is unclear. The original intention of the act was that the proper officer should be a registered medical practitioner. However, many hold that this qualification is not necessary.9 Uncertainty also arises over the intended effect of removal. The act gives removal to hospital as one option. We tend to associate residence in hospital with treatment. Often people detained under these orders will accept treatment after admission. Compulsory treatment is not, however, provided for in the act itself. Those involved in implementing the orders are also unclear as to who has the power to discharge the patient. One writer discusses a situation where a man was illegally discharged by doctors before the order had expired, against the advice of the proper officer who had originally certified the need for the order.'0 Medicine is fogging the issue. Illness is not the basis for the action and the proper officer need not be medically competent. We should forget the medical model.
Greave's criticism of the action loses force where the proper officer is not merely voicing an individual opinion but that of the public. The relevance ofpublic opinion is demonstrated when we try to identify who might have a legal duty as opposed to a right to use the legislation. There is no legal liability resulting from inaction, no case for personal injury or negligence against the proper officer. However, he or she is answerable to the coroner or the local authority if problems arise. The local authority in turn is answerable to the electorate. Media interest is great in these cases.
Public opinion
The pressure of public opinion perhaps reflects a more general belief that we should act even where this duty is not enshrined in law. The popular view is that someone should intervene in these cases. However, we should not infer any act is an ethical duty solely on the basis of its wide acceptance.
Mill's firm rejection of paternalism was developed specifically because he was aware of the potential "tyranny of the majority". Having described the development of popular government he writes: "It was now perceived that such phrases as 'self government', and 'the power of the people over themselves', do not express the true state of the case. The 'people' who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the 'self government' spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest... . The limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals loses none of its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to the strongest party therein."6 Mill recognises tyranny is not restricted to political power. He saw the power of governmentality long before Foucault coined the word." "Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant -society collectively over the separate individuals who compose it -its means of tyrannising are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society ... practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression."6 I do not wish to challenge Mill's claim that individuals are the most appropriate judges of their own interests. I will examine next the justifications of paternalistic interventions which stand even when this claim is accepted. These depend on some notion of consent being given.
Paternalism is generally attacked on the grounds that it infringes individual autonomythat it restricts freedom of choice. This has two adverse effects. Firstly date for the action is very specific. He suggests the concept of a "social insurance policy" whereby we can "consent to a system of government, run by elected representatives, with an understanding that they may act to safeguard our interests in certain limited ways".'2 Such insurance allows people to protect themselves against future dangerous conduct. He limits the possible use of this consent, in order to protect against its abuse, to situations where the overridden decisions are "far reaching, potentially dangerous, and irreversible".'6 The goods endangered must be the prerequisites to other goods and the choices must be seen to be irrational. Such irrationality will be recognised where the decisions don't express the actual preference of the individuals (perhaps because emotional reaction to risks overwhelms the intellect) or where the individual appears to have "evaluative delusions" and is unable to make accurate assessments of risk.
Counterarguments
At first sight the individuals affected by section 47 would seem to form a group to whom this social insurance policy might apply. Their decisions to remain at home are potentially dangerous, indeed one might suppose often fatally so. Health and life are prerequisites to many other goods. It is difficult for those intervening not to believe that some evaluative delusions must be present, as such refusal of help appears irrational. However, three counterarguments can be given.
Firstly, there is little evidence of prior consent having been given. Although one researcher found elderly patients supported the act,'3 his study population was probably significantly different from the population to whom the act is applied. There is some evidence that individuals who fall foul of the act have been lifelong eccentrics.
Secondly, the use of prior consent can only be justified where contemporaneous consent is not available. To assume this we must be able to argue that the person refusing removal is incompetent in some way. The section does not require competence to be examined. Without further explicit examination, the judgment of incompetence must be based on the assumption that no rational person would choose to live in such a state. However, we know that this assumption is incorrect. Disgusting behaviour is not always irrational behaviour. As Dworkin states in a more recent discussion: "... No one may be prevented from influencing the shared moral environment, through his own private choices, tastes, opinions, and example, just because these tastes or opinions disgust those who have the power to shut him up or lock him up." '4 We are in danger of exhibiting the very tyranny of the majority we set out to avoid.
In addition, when the outcome of removal includes such a high risk of death the irrationality of the decisions is less clear. The individuals may, indeed, be more aware of their best interests than the professionals. There may be no "evaluative delusions". Perhaps it is the professionals who suffer from delusions, as they act despite lack of hard evidence of the benefits of removal. Their judgments are based on gut feelings that the situations cannot but be improved upon. It is their emotions rather than their reasoning that leads to this conclusion. Whatever the strength of Dworkin's position on prior consent, it seems doubtful that it should be applied here.
If Trust and respect Greaves suggests a different perspective where: "the resolution of this ethical dilemma requires a different moral conception, involving the recognition that there is an inevitable conflict of view between the patient and the community doctor, and that both sides be respected by being taken seriously." 8 Greaves feels that the underlying trust in the doctor -patient relationship is the important factor in justifying these actions. Rejection of the medical model undermines this point. In addition it seems ludicrous to talk of trust occurring between the subject of the order and its executor.
Muir Gray argues similarly.
"When I use section 47 I am in effect saying 'I respect your opinion, I believe that you are sane and that it is a valid opinion but I also believe that it is wrong"'."6
It is difficult to see what is meant by "respect" in this situation. One would generally expect showing respect to other people's opinions to require that we allow them to act on these opinions. This is clearly not what Muir Gray means. Just as the trust identified by Greaves does not involve the patient, so the mutual respect experienced by Muir Gray seems very lopsided.
In the public interest Less explicit motives for use of this act have been suggested. Firstly it may result from rationing. In 1987, a community physician applied for an order on the grounds that the patient required more nursing care than the district service could supply. The magistrates refused the order for other reasons but the argument regarding the cost of community care was not explicitly rejected. '7 Muir Gray claims this is a real ethical issue, drawing a parallel with renal transplantation rationing. In both, he suggests, the professional's definition of need is influenced by shortage of resources.15
Andrew Grubb suggests there is a public interest in showing care to those who suffer. He writes: "A doctor cannot be required to refrain from treating a patient so that in effect, the patient is abandoned. A patient probably, therefore, could not validly refuse basic care in the form of what is often termed 'nursing care'. Public policy would prohibit a patient refusing such treatment."' 8 The Law Commission suggested that this argument could extend to capable patients, claiming that this would not be a significant infringement of the patient's rights of self determination.'9 However, this argument appears to be shaky when applied to section 47. Here we are discussing serious infringements of individual liberty. Even if we were to accept the validity of a utilitarian weighting, the costs to the individual must surely outweigh the benefits to society.
Another possible motivation is the potential of section 47 to control social deviance. In this respect Muir Gray refers to the well known debate following the publication of the Wolfenden report regarding the justification of such use of the law to enforce society's morals. Again we must fear that the act is an example of the potential tyranny of the state so clearly laid out by Mill. If we accept these more utilitarian arguments for interventions in the public interest, the act still remains deficient. If it is society's best interests which form the underlying basis for the decision this should be explicitly stated, not disguised as action in the individual's best interests.
Conclusion
Society has changed considerably since this act was written. Paternalism is less acceptable. We generally reject the role of the state in enforcing morals. The discussion above demonstrates that attempts to justify its actions in the interests of those removed are all flawed. Ifwe wish to base the justification on the utilitarian argument for the public interest or on the incapacity of those removed to consent, this should at least be explicitly stated. Despite the lack of valid justifications this section remains in use.
What should be done? The morality of such approaches requires further consideration. There are sometimes underlying problems involving individuals in real need of care which cannot at present be answered in any other way than use of section 47. Is it right to deny what may be the best available, although admittedly imperfect, option to one person in the hope of improving the law for others? Is it reasonable to expect individual proper officers to risk unpleasant media criticism in such a cause? Do the doctors involved have an absolute duty to publicise these cases, or do the personal risks involved make this a superogatory duty?
These are not easy cases, they challenge all involved. Unfortunately the present legislation hinders the finding of the best solutions. It is unnecessarily restrictive of the liberty of those to whom it applies. It gives inadequate safeguards to those in danger of removal and those undertaking it. It is an example of state tyranny that cannot be defended. As such, it is in the best interests of no one. Continuing its use conceals the need for reform and so delays the introduction of alternative legislation.
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